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Abstract
The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality
under the no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is
certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and,
more recently, philosophers. The argument, known as quantum
suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discus-
sion, but there hasn’t been any questioning of David Lewis’s point
that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we
should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more
damaged state, that barely sustains life. This is the prospect of
eternal quantum torment. Based on some empirical facts, I argue
for a conclusion that is much more reassuring than Lewis’s terrible
scenario.1
1. From Quantum Immortality to Quantum Torment
The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality
under the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is
certain, as pointed out by several authors2. The argument goes as
follows. If there are no collapses of the wavefunction, then the
actual world is branching, as time passes, into several parallel
1 I would like to thank audiences at Boğazici University (Istanbul) and Central Euro-
pean University (Budapest) for valuable feedback on the main ideas of this paper. I would
also like to acknolwedge the continued financial support for my research by TÜBITAK
(The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) over the last 2 years.
2 For example: Euan J. Squires, The Mystery of the Quantum World (Bristol Institute of
Physics Publishing, 1986), Hans P. Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human
Intelligence (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 188–190, H. Dieter Zeh, The
Physical Basis of the Direction of Time (Berlin: Springer Verlag 1992), Huw Price, Time’s Arrow
and Archimedes’ Point (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996), pp. 221–222, Max Tegmark,
‘The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: Many Worlds or Many Words?’, Fortschritte der
Physik 46 (1998), pp. 855–862, Peter Lewis, ‘What is it Like to Be Schrödinger’s Cat?’,
Analysis 60 (2000), pp. 22–29, and David K. Lewis, ‘How Many Lives has Schrödinger’s
Cat?’, The Jack Smart Lecture, Canberra, 27 June 2001, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82
(2004), pp. 3–22. The thought experiment is known as ‘quantum suicide’, first proposed
by physicists in 1980s, then widely discussed by several philosophers starting with Peter
Lewis’s ‘What it is like . . .’.
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worlds according to the space of possible quantum states of the
world that are in superposition as reflected by the time-dependent
Schrödinger equation, each of these branches being equally real
and actual3. The outcome of life-threatening situations are no less
governed by quantum mechanical processes as everything else in
our universe; ‘we are all Schrödinger’s cats’, to use David Lewis’s
(‘How Many Lives’, pp. 18–19) formula. Such situations corre-
spond to branchings of the actual world into a branch on which
the subject of the situation dies and at least one other branch on
which the subject is alive. If we are interested in what our subjec-
tive expectation about survival should be in such life-and-death
branchings, then the set of branches that are relevant to the
computation does not include those in which we don’t survive.
Since being dead is not compatible with having any experience
at all, the space of branches of actuality that we have to distribute
probabilities over when inquiring into what experience to expect
in the future is the space of those on which we are alive. So,
however small the probability of surviving a life-and-death
quantum branching, we will always find ourselves on the side of
life and never on the side of death. Hence, since the number
of such increasingly improbable survival branches is infinite,
given that the probability of surviving never drops to zero, we
should expect to be alive forever. This is what we call ‘quantum
immortality’.
This is good news for those who value longevity, but David
Lewis (‘How Many Lives’, p. 20) argues that:
A terrifying corollary has gone unmentioned. As well as life-
and-death branchings, there may be life-and-life branchings
such that you suffer harm on some branches and not on others.
In some of these branchings, the harm branches get the lion’s
share of the total intensity. The intensity rule applies, so you
should predominantly expect to find yourself harmed. As you
survive deadly danger over and over again, you should also
expect to suffer repeated harms. You should expect to lose your
loved ones, your eyes and limbs, your mental powers, and your
health.
3 Born’s Rule assigns probabilities, whose numerical values are given by the squared
moduli of the probability amplitudes in Scrödinger’s equation, to these possible states, but
that does not make any of them less actual. This tension between the idea of states being
both actual and probable is taken as the chief weakness of the many-worlds interpretation
of quantum mechanics.
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What Lewis refers to as the intensity rule is that one should
distribute expectations over branches according to their intensi-
ties in a way that would match the predictions of quantum
mechanics regarding the observational outcomes of collapses, i.e.
in a way to match Born’s Rule (see my footnote 2). Once the death
branches have been eliminated from the space of possible out-
comes, we should subjectively expect to live forever, given that all
branchings are life-and-life branchings, but given that all these
branchings happen in the vicinity of death, we should expect to be
predominantly harmed, since being harmed in life-threatening
situations is very probable, hence it gets the lion’s share of the
total intensity of possible survival scenarios. We should, therefore,
expect something like eternal torment. This is Lewis’s terrifying
corollary, and he expresses a genuine personal concern for his
own future at the end of his article.
2. From the Terrifying Corollary to the Comforting Corollary
There have been a number of critical discussions dedicated to
various aspects of the argument for quantum immortality and its
basis, the many-worlds interpretation4, but, to my knowledge, no
one has so far questioned David Lewis’s terrifying corollary, or,
more exactly, that that is the right implication of quantum immor-
tality. So it looks as though there is agreement that if the
argument for immortality is sound, then, by that argument’s
assumptions, the terrifying corollary of quantum torment follows,
so we should be very concerned about our future. It is this move
that I would like to question in this paper, and argue that, in fact,
something almost opposite to torment is to be expected, given
Lewis’s assumptions.
I start by noting that the reason death branches are to be
discarded when evaluating the intensities of various branches of
4 For instance, David Papineau, ‘Why You don’t Want to Get in the Box with
Schrödinger’s Cat’, Analysis 63 (2003), pp. 51–58, David Papineau, ‘David Lewis and
Schrödinger’s Cat’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2004), pp. 153–169, Paul Tap-
penden, ‘The Ins and Outs of Schrödinger’s Cat Box: A Response to Papineau’, Analysis 64
(2004), pp. 157–164, Hilary Greaves, ‘Understanding Deutsch’s Probability in a Determin-
istic Multiverse’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (2004), pp. 423–456,
Milan Ćirković, ‘Is Quantum Suicide Painless? On an Apparent Violation of the Principal
Principle’, Foundations of Science 11 (2006), pp. 287–296.
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my future is that being dead is not an experiential state at all.
‘Death is oblivion’, as Lewis (‘How Many Lives’, p. 17) puts it. So
the variable that is responsible for both the new event space
(lacking death branches) and for the high likelihood of future
suffering within that space is consciousness, not life as such.
The experience of suffering requires a minimal level of self-
awareness and various cognitive functions. Life, on the other
hand, can also be lived in coma or in a persistent vegetative
state. Coma is understood in medical science as a state with no
consciousness whatsoever and from which the patient cannot be
aroused, whereas the vegetative state is ‘absence of responsive-
ness and awareness due to overwhelming dysfunction of the
cerebral hemispheres, with sufficient sparing of the diencepha-
lon and brain stem to preserve autonomic and motor reflexes
and sleep-wake cycles. Patients may have complex reflexes,
including eye movements, yawning, and involuntary movements
to noxious stimuli but show no awareness of self or environment’.
(Merck Manual Online Edition 2008)
Lewis’s description of the torment you should expect refers to
surviving with enough of you to sustain life, not to surviving with
enough of you to sustain self-awareness; here is a quote (‘How Many
Lives’, p. 20):
‘What does matter is that the overwhelming share of the total
intensity goes to branches on which less than all of you, in fact
a lot less than all of you, in fact only just barely enough of you to
sustain life, reappears. Much the same goes for all the other
deadly dangers that we face.
What you should predominantly expect, if the no-collapse
hypothesis is true, is cumulative deterioration that stops just
short of death.’ (My emphasis)
Yet, in the argument for quantum immortality it is not life per se,
but consciousness or self-awareness that plays a role; a branch
containing an eternal life in a vegetative state or in coma is no
different from one containing death.
The distinction I have just pointed out will be admitted to make
a huge difference to the argument for expecting torment once
some statistical facts about death are presented. Death as such is
usually preceded by a process, however short, of dying. Fred
Feldman even proposes a concept of dying2 to account for death as
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a process5. Statistically, most cases of death are preceded by a
process of dying. The process involves brain death at the future
end, but brain death is always preceded by states of unconscious-
ness. This is true even of deaths that are considered sudden, like
death from cardio-respiratory arrest. There is a brief temporal
interval in which the victim is not conscious. Other times death is
preceded by a longer period of coma or by coma followed by a
vegetative state. These can last from a few seconds to several years.
All these proximate states of dying are unconscious, hence, follow-
ing the logic of the argument for quantum immortality, they
should be discarded when computing our expectations. Cases of
instantaneous deaths are very rare. Some such cases are when, say,
a two-ton piece of concrete falls perpendicular on one’s head from
a certain distance, or, to use Feldman’s example, when a butterfly
happens to be fluttering in the immediate vicinity of a nuclear
blast. Therefore, it is not only death per se, but the vicinity of death
as well that is imbued with oblivion.
There are few more statistical facts about dying that we need to
make explicit.6 Lewis talks about ‘cumulative deterioration that
stops just short of death’ as what we should expect. Now, stopping
short of death means suffering a life-threatening condition. Such
conditions are most strongly statistically positively correlated with
death, and second most strongly with very deep coma. Very deep
coma (as measured by the Glasgow Coma Scale) strongly posi-
tively correlates with death, again. So from a subjective point of
view what we should expect in terms of experiences is not stop-
ping short of death in the sense of making it to the vicinity of
death, but rather not making it to that vicinity at all (only to the
vicinity of that vicinity), given that the vicinity of death is imbued
with oblivion. We should expect not make it as far towards death
as to even lose consciousness. In other words, we should not
expect to be in a life-threatening condition to begin with.
To be sure, it is compatible with this finding that we should
expect to get old and sick, but never close to a resuscitation
machine or to intensive care unit, as Lewis’ scenario suggest. We
would at most be in mild and short coma, a non-life-threatening
5 Fred Feldman, Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and
Value of Death (Oxford University Press, 1992), chapter 5.
6 They can be checked in a recent study by David Bates, which synthesizes the relevant
findings: ‘The Prognosis of Medical Coma’, Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry
71 (2001), pp. i20–i23.
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condition which is a positive predictor of good recovery, without
severe disabilities. To live like this for eternity is definitely not a
torment as the one Lewis envisages, but the ‘usual decrepitude’ if
we are to otherwise (i.e. non-quantum-mechanics motivated) live
forever. The Terrifying Corollary is thus replaced by the Comfort-
ing Corollary.
3. Interlude: How comforting is this?
A fair question at this point is whether this scenario is to be called
‘comforting’ in any sense. It looks as though what I have called the
‘usual decrepitude’ would no less be considered uncomfortable
by any ordinary standards than the quantum mechanics based
scenario. Fair enough.
There are two questions to be addressed here. One is whether
Lewis’s quantum-based scenario of decrepitude is intended, or at
least can be understood, as especially nasty, namely, nastier than
the scenario of merely aging, as we actually do, but with the
difference that it continues indefinitely and without the occur-
rence of any life-threatening condition. The other issue is whether
my ‘comforting scenario’ is in itself to be preferred to death, or, in
other words, whether we should be happy with the truth of the
many-worlds account.
To start with the second issue, of course, I don’t think we
should be happy with the truth of the many-worlds interpretation.
Death is preferable, but not because there something especially
nasty about the quantum mechanical setting generating immor-
tality. It is because of more general considerations about unhap-
piness resulting from immortality regardless of what is the reason
for being immortal, which is well depicted in various literary
works.
Regarding the first issue, there are in Lewis’s article both pas-
sages that indicate that quantum immortality is something akin to
hell, that is, much nastier than mere indefinite aging, and that
it is meant simply as aging indefinitely. The former interpretation
is to be found in several places, including the second passage I
quoted above, where Lewis thinks of quantum immortality as life
constantly spent in the vicinity of death, where just barely enough
of you to sustain life continues to exist, which situation is relevant
not only to life-threatening accidents, but also to ‘all the other
deadly dangers that we face’.
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Evidence for the latter interpretation is to be found in my first
quote, as well as in the passage where Lewis likens the quantum
immortality scenario to the situation of the Struldbrugs depicted in
Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, who are immortal but indefi-
nitely undergoing the normal processes of aging. Of course, the
situation of the Struldbrugs is far from pleasant, and I’m not sure
whether Lewis meant to distinguish it from an even nastier
quantum torment of the kind that is prompted by thinking about
‘barely enough of you to sustain life’, but even if he didn’t, the
distinction does make sense and seems justified. If so, then my
argument is directed against the concern for the likelihood of this
‘real torment’, the remaining potential disagreement being
terminological.
4. Lucky avoidances
Now, of course, what the scenario I have argued for in section 2
means is that we will go through an extremely unlikely infinite
series of lucky avoidances of the dangers of life, and that is itself
perhaps very implausible. The scenario appears as highly unlikely
per se, but a moment of inspection shows that it is not really so
in the context of comparing it with Lewis’s scenario. To illustrate
the point, let us use Lewis’s own example of how to test the
no-collapse hypothesis, namely, imagine that you are crossing the
highway at closing time (‘How many lives’, p. 19), and you have
your eyes closed. Lewis’s line of thought is that you should expect
to unluckily survive infinitely many such crossing attempts, all these
attempts being ended by a high frontal impact with a car, and to
always wake up in a hospital, in a worse and worse condition.
According to my line of thought, you should rather expect to
always luckily avoid life-threatening events in infinitely many such
crossing attempts, by not being hit (too hard) by a car to begin
with. That is so because according to my argument the branching
of the world, relevant from the subjective perspective, takes place
earlier than it does according to Lewis. According to him it takes
place just before the moment of death, according to my reasoning
it takes place just before the moment of losing consciousness.
Hence, according to my argument, when crossing the highway
you should not expect to even lose consciousness, hence, you
should not expect to be hit (too hard) by a car at all. So instead of
surviving a huge impact, you should expect that the driver swerves
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at the very last moment before impact! In other words, since the
subjectively relevant superposition is loss-of-consciousness/no-loss-of-
consciousness, there must be a corresponding superposition at the
level of the impact events (dangers of life), and that will be the
high-frontal-impact/no-high-frontal-impact superposition.
Which one is likelier: Lewis’s scenario or mine? My intuition is
that the latter. The reason is that being hit by a car in that
situation is extremely likely, so not being hit is extremely unlikely;
but, at the same time, once you are hit with high impact the
chances of survival are at least as low (if not clearly lower!) as the
chances of not having been hit at all, namely, the chances that all
the relevant drivers swerved at the right moment when you were
crossing the road. And, as a matter of empirical fact, we observe a
higher number of successfully swerving drivers than of miracu-
lously surviving pedestrians.
So there is nothing very implausible, or at least more implau-
sible, about my survival scenario, based on perpetual avoidance of
dangers, as compared to Lewis’ survival scenario, based on per-
petual harm resulting from encounters with those dangers.
5. The problem of miraculous recovery
There is, however, a possibility in the space of branches compat-
ible with self-awareness that we have missed in the above
discussion, namely, the case in which someone suffers a truly
life-threatening condition, characterized by deep coma, and nev-
ertheless regains self-awareness and ends up in a condition of
severe disability. This is a case of suffering like the ones Lewis
envisages. It is a case of making it to the vicinity of death, but
escaping, unluckily. And it does actually happen although very
rarely. However rarely it happens, according to the argument for
quantum immortality it should be taken as a likely outcome if it
gets the lion’s share of total intensity associated with all the
branching scenarios that are compatible with self-awareness.
The question is, therefore, whether it really gets the lion’s share of
the total intensity of conscious branches.
Following Lewis’s line of thought according to which after
repeated injuries you should find barely enough of yourself to
sustain life, and changing ‘life’ with ‘consciousness’, we get the
result that you should expect immortality with barely enough of
you to sustain consciousness. But it is a fact that barely enough of
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you (i.e. neurophysiological basis) to sustain consciousness corre-
lates with barely enough of consciousness. The more damage your
brain suffers, the less you are able to suffer. The first level of
consciousness after coma and the vegetative state is the so-called
Minimally Conscious State, a condition formally recognized in
1995, at the American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine.7 This
state can, therefore, be taken as the bare minimum of conscious-
ness for humans. There is some evidence that there is minimal
emotional processing in this state, reflected in cortical activity as
revealed by MRI and PET studies,8 so it looks as though this state
could serve as the filler of the role of eternal quantum torment.
However, as we are focusing on being perpetually in the vicinity
of death and then escaping, what we should expect is an infinite
series of relapses into coma or the vegetative state followed by
reemergence into the minimally conscious state. As this infinite
process implies perpetual cumulative degradation of the neuro-
physiological basis of consciousness, we should expect longer and
longer periods of unconsciousness coupled with shorter and
shorter episodes of minimal consciousness.
Further, it is well documented in the medical literature that
emergence from coma or the vegetative state is followed by
amnesia, and in the minimal conscious state nothing more in
terms of memory than recalling one’s name has been shown to be
present.9 This means that in the long run the shorter and shorter
episodes of self-awareness are also mnemonically disconnected
from one another. When waking up, you shouldn’t remember any
of your previous episodes of minimal consciousness. Hence, what
we should expect in the long run, from the subject’s point of view,
if the no-collapse hypothesis is true and our previous hypothesis of
never making it to the vicinity of death is false, is not an eternal life
of suffering, but rather one extremely brief moment of possibly
7 J.T. Giacino and R. Malone, ‘The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States’. In G.B.
Young and E.F.M. Wijdicks (eds.), Handbook of Clinical Neurology. Disorders of Consciousness
(Elsevier BV, 2008).
8 T. Bekinsschtein et al., ‘Emotion Processing in the Minimally Conscious State’, Journal
of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry 75 (2004), p. 788, S. Lauries et al., ‘Cerebral
Processing in the Minimally Conscious State’, Neurology 63 (2004), pp. 916–918.
9 R. Nakase-Richardson et al., ‘Emergence from Minimally Conscious State’, Neurology
73 (2009), pp. 1120–1126.
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painful self-awareness10 – call it the ‘Momentary Life’ scenario.
This is also far from Lewis’s terrifying corollary.
6. The problems of miraculous escape and conscious
vegetative state
There are two more possibilities that we should consider. One is
that of miraculous escape. Miraculous escape is not the same as
miraculous recovery. In my argument I assumed that the loss of
consciousness occurs simultaneously with the impact event (the
life-threatening quantum accident). If we don’t assume that, but
rather that loss of consciousness occurs (very shortly) after the
impact happens, then we get what I call ‘miraculous escape’. In
this scenario, first the impact event occurs, and then the
consciousness-and-unconsciousness branching occurs immediately
after. This means that what I should expect is to suffer the acci-
dent, but not even lose my consciousness. In other words, even
though the accident is really life threatening (unlike in the sce-
nario entailed by my argument against Lewis), at its completion I
emerge without a scratch. Now, such a scenario is a possibility
in quantum mechanics, as Lewis himself points out by appeal to
the phenomenon of quantum tunneling, but, again, as Lewis
himself admits, it looks as the most unlikely of all possible sce-
narios (‘How many lives’, p. 18). Hence, it is not a threat to the
scenario entailed by my argument.
The second possibility is that of consciousness in the vegetative
state. Recent empirical work by Adrian Owen of Cambridge Uni-
versity shows, indeed, that there is likely residual cognitive pro-
cessing even in the persistent vegetative state, for which it used to
be orthodoxy to be defined as not involving any level of conscious-
ness – it used to be understood as ‘a state of wakefulness without
awareness’.11
It looks as though if there is consciousness in the persistent
vegetative state, a state that is most likely to occur after coma, but
10 Objectively speaking, of course, the expectation is eternal life, spent almost entirely in
an unconscious state.
11 Adrian M. Owen et al., ‘Detecting Residual Cognitive Function in Persistent Vegeta-
tive State (PVS)’, Neurocase 8 (2002), pp. 394–403, A. M. Owen, et al., ‘Residual Auditory
Function in Persistent Vegetative State: A combined PET and fMRI study’, Neuropsychologi-
cal Rehabilitation 15(2005), pp. 290–306. Thanks to Katalin Farkas for raising the objection
and calling my attention to Owen’s work.
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can also occur right after a life-threatening accident, then this
state can also serve as a version of Lewis’s torment since it might
involve the capacity of the victim to suffer. The persistent vegeta-
tive state is likely enough to occur after life-threatening events,
hence, we can’t appeal to intrinsic improbability as in the case of
miraculous escape.
However, in order for the conscious vegetative state to threaten
my argument, one needs to have empirical evidence that there is
consciousness from the very beginning of the occurrence of that
state, that is, immediately after the accident occurs, so that loss of
consciousness does not occur at all. Only that way one could argue
to the likelihood ending up in that state, from the subjective point
of view, as the accident occurs. Otherwise, if consciousness occurs
later and after an episode of unconsciousness, then we are back to
the argument for the scenario entailed by miraculous recovery
(the Momentary Life scenario).
7. Conclusion
We are left with two likely scenarios of what we should expect as
regards our future immortal life if the many-worlds interpretation
of quantum mechanics is the right one: the Comforting Corollary
and Momentary Life. We can’t assess whether one or the other
gets the lion’s share of the total intensity associated with branches
compatible with self-awareness, but we can be sure that they
together (i.e. their disjunction) do indeed get the lion’s share,
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